20170806 KODANSHA INTERNATIONAL LTD.刊 Hyoe-Murakami著 『Japan The Years of Trial1919-52』pp.178-180より抜粋引用

KODANSHA INTERNATIONAL LTD.刊
Hyoe-Murakami著
『Japan The Years of Trial1919-52』pp.178-180より抜粋引用
ISBN-10: 087011610X
ISBN-13: 978-0870116100

『The Potsdam Declaration was published on July 26 in in the name of Truman, Churchill, and Ciang Kai-shek. With in the Japanese government, it was Foreign Minister Togo who insited most strongly that Japan should agree to its terms; he had taken note of the fact that they could be interpreted as implying something other than unconditional surrender. The fact that Stalin was not among the signatories of the declaration also gave him grounds to suppose that the Soviet Union, faithful to the neutrality pact, and had mediated on Japan’s behalf. The terms laid down in the declaration-the limiting of Japanese territory to the four main islands, the restriction of the function of the Japanese government, occupation, disarmament, and the punishment of war criminals among them-were extremely harsh, and there was plenty of food for doubt and uneasiness; yet, as Togo saw it, to let this opportunity to begin negotiations go by would be even more fatal. Nevertheless the opposition of the military was as implacable as ever. Suzuki put forward compromise proposal, whereby the press was to report the declaration without any comment whatsoever, thereby giving a signal that Japan was paying heed to it.

The morning editions of the twenty-eighth, however-despite the government’s attempts to impose restraints-carried headlines referditional surrender as ''plot by the three powers'' and dismissing the call for unconditional surrender as ''preposterous.'' Hastly, Suzuki personally called a press conference at which he stated that the attitude of the Japanese government toward the Potsdam Declaration was one of ''mokusatsu''. As Suzuki intended it, this word was the equivalent of the English ''no comment,'' but in Japanese broadcasts directed overseas it turned out as ''ignore,'' and New York Times of July 30 carried a headline annoucing that Japan had rejected the Allies' final call for it to surrender. Thus President  Truman lost any chance of checking use of the atomic bomb at the last moment. The Japanese government, in short, still expecting that the Soviet Union would mediate on its behalf, had attached insufficient importance to its own response to the Potsdam Declaration.

At 3 A.M. on August 6, the Enola Gay took off from the base on the island of Tinian carrying the first atomic bomb ever to be dropped on mankind, and at some time past 8A.M. arrived in the sky over Hiroshima. The bomb, suspended from a parachute, exploded at a point 600 meters above ground level. It was 8:15, at which time the city’s clocks stopped forever. A single bomb wiped out an entire city. Thirteen square kilometers of the center were seared by the terrifying blast, heat, and radiation; at least two hundred thousand citizens either were killed instantly or died after days-in some cases, months-of suffering. As the plane in which Dr. Nishina Yoshio-an atomic physicist who flew to Hiroshima at Japanese army orders-arrived in the sky over Hiroshima, one glance was enough to tell him that it could only have been an atomic bomb. His judgment was confirmed by foreign broadcasts. On the afternoon on August 8, on receiving formal notification from Dr. Nishina that the weapon dropped on Hiroshima had unquestionabley been an atomic bomb, Prime Minister Suzuki realized that the war must be brought to a rapid conclusion and directed Cabinet Secretary Sakomizu to summon a meeting of the Supreme Council for the Conduct of the war for the following day.』